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DO WE REALLY NEED THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE?
KENNETH WILuJAMs*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Rules of Evidence have been in place for more than
twenty years.' Since their inception, the Federal Rules have received
some intense criticism. Within the past decade, the Litigation and Criminal Justice Sections of the ABA and a number of academics and judges
have identified a wide range of developing problems with the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 2 However, despite these problems, there has been no
major overhaul of the rules, as has occurred, for instance, with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Only six substantive amendments to
3
the rules have been made.
In response to some of the criticism, the United States Judicial
Conference formed an Evidence Advisory Committee, consisting of
respected judges, practitioners, and academics. 4 The committee has
been charged with the responsibility of reviewing and recommending
amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence. 5
A sufficient amount of time has elapsed since codification so that an
assessment of the Federal Rules would now be appropriate. Have the
Federal Rules worked as planned? Do we really need rules of evidence?
Are there alternatives which would work better? This paper begins with a
discussion of how the Federal Rules came into being. Next, the strengths
and weaknesses of the Federal Rules are discussed. Several alternatives
to the Federal Rules are then explored: 1) no rules of admissibility, the
system which presently exists in France; 2) limited rules of admissibility,
* Associate Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law. B.A. University of San
Francisco (1983); J.D. University of Virginia (1986). The writer wishes to thank Professors Bobby
Harges and Thomas Kleven for reviewing this article and providing helpful comments.
1. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on June 1, 1975. See Edward R. Becker &
Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years the Effect of "Plain Meaning"
Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for
Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 858 (1992).
2. See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 1,at 858-59.
3. Id. at 859.
4. The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules was constituted in 1993. The chair of the committee is U.S. Circuit Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr. The members of the committee are U.S. Circuit Judge
Jerry E. Smith, U.S. District Judges Fern M. Smith and Milton I. Shadur, Court of Claims Judge James
T. Turner, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia Harold G. Clarke, Professor Kenneth Broun
of the University of North Carolina School of Law, and practicing attorneys Gregory P. Joseph and
James K. Robinson. The Committee also includes two liaison members, U.S. Magistrate Wayne D.
Brazil and Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg. Information concerning the committee was provided by
the committee's reporter, Professor Margaret A. Berger of the Brooklyn Law School.
5. This information was also provided by Professor Margaret Berger.
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the system utilized presently by the Germans; and 3) evidence rules
which are more detailed than the Federal Rules.
There will then be an assessment as to which of the four possibilities-no evidence rules, limited rules, more detailed rules, or the
present system-is most desirable. Included in this assessment will be
the views of some federal judges who were surveyed for this paper.
Finally, some recommendations which may make the system more
workable will be offered.
II.

PRE-FEDERAL RULES HISTORY

Before the Federal Rules were codified, rules of evidence in both
state and federal courts were created by judicial decisions. 6 This was due
primarily to the fact that attempts at codification had failed and existing
federal law was of little help in making evidence rulings.
There were numerous efforts to codify evidence law prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules. First, Dean Wigmore wrote an early code
in 1909. His code proved to be unworkable because it was too detailed. 7
In 1939, the American Law Institute began work on the Model Code of
Evidence which was published in 1942.8 However, since the Model Code
was highly technical and contained many radical changes to the existing
law of evidence, such as giving great discretion to the trial judge, 9
6. See RONALD

CARLSON ET. AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINErIEs 21 (3d ed. 1991).
7. See J. WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE (1909).
8. CARLSON, supra note 6, at 22.
9. In his foreword to the Model Code, Professor Edmond M. Morgan, the project's reporter,
wrote that:
[t]he proposed Code leaves no room for doubt as to the power of the trial judge. His
historic role as master of the trial is restored. He has complete control of the conduct of
the trial ....
[H]e is to see to it that the evidence is presented honestly, expeditiously and
in such form as to be readily understood: to this end he regulates in his discretion such
matters as the order in which evidence is to be offered and witnesses are to be called,
the number of witnesses to be called for a single term, the conduct of counsel in
examining witnesses, the manner and scope of examination and cross-examination, the
use of leading questions, of memoranda to refresh recollection, and of maps, models,
diagrams, summaries and other devices for making testimony readily understandable,
and production of available documents on demand. And he may of his own motion
exclude evidence which would be inadmissible if a proper objection were made or a
proper claim of privilege interposed.
AMERICAN LAW INST., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE

13-14 (1942).
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opposition to it was fierce1O and the Model Code was not adopted in any
jurisdiction."I
Next, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws undertook an alternative code, and in 1953 the Conference
unanimously approved the proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence. 12
Despite the fact that they were endorsed by the American Bar Association, the Uniform Rules met with only slightly greater success than the
Model Code. 13 By 1971, the Uniform Rules had only been adopted in
Kansas, New Jersey, and Utah.14 Finally, in 1965, a fourth codification,
the California Evidence Code was enacted by the California legislature.'S
It was generally considered a success and was used as a vehicle for
making modifications in the common law tradition.16
As mentioned earlier, existing federal law was also of little help in
determining the admissibility of evidence. In civil cases, the applicable
provision was then Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which provided in pertinent part that:
evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing
of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the
courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United
States court is held. 17
This rule was unhelpful because there were few federal statutes governing the admissibility of evidence and it was difficult to determine the
evidence rules in federal equity cases. 18 Federal courts, therefore, tended
to follow the evidence law as it existed in the state in which it sat.19
In criminal cases, the situation was no better. Then Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provided that "the admissibility of
10. The following quote by the California Committee to the Governors of the State Bar is typical:
[T]he Code seeks to destroy the foundation upon which our for the administration of
justice is founded and substitute an entirely new theory ....The Code proceeds upon the
theory that all the wisdom and learning of the past is to be discarded; that the rights of
parties are no longer to depend upon settled rules of law of evidence but upon the view
of the individual judge.
Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Quality of Practice in Federal Courts, 27
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 173, 178 (1978).
11. See CARLSON, supra note 6, at 22.
12. See id. at 22.
13. See id. at 22-23.
14. See id. at 23.
15. See C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 4 (3d ed. 1996).
16. Id. at 4.
17. CARLSON, supra note 6, at 23-24.
18. See id. at 24.
19. Id.
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evidence ... shall be governed ... by the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of
reason and experience." 2 0 The standard set forth in Rule 26 also proved
to be of little help in creating uniform and consistent rules of evidence.
It merely encouraged the development of a reasoned body of federal
law. 21
III. CODIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES
Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed a Special Committee on Evidence in 1961.22 The committee was charged with the task of determining "whether uniform rules of evidence for the federal courts were advisable and feasible." 23 A year later, the Committee issued a preliminary
report for review by the bench and bar. 24 The response was "favorable." 25 The Special Committee issued a final report, "concluding that
federal evidence rules were feasible and desirable." 2 6
The report was submitted to the United States Supreme Court for
approval and in March of 1965, Chief Justice Warren announced the
appointment of an Advisory Committee to prepare a draft of the rules of
evidence. 27 The Committee's preliminary draft of the Federal Rules of
Evidence was published and circulated to the legal profession for
comment in March of 1969.28 After receiving comments on the proposed rules, the draft was revised. 29 That draft was approved by the Judicial Conference and forwarded to the United States Supreme Court in
1970.30 After some additional changes, the Supreme Court approved the
rules on November 20, 1972 and authorized the Chief Justice to transmit
them to Congress. 3 1
As a result of congressional opposition, 32 the rules were not approved by Congress until December of 1974 and became law when the
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id.
24. id. at 24.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 409 U.S. 1132 (1972). Justice William 0. Douglas was the lone dissenter. He doubted
whether rules of evidence were in the purview of the statute under which the Court had authority to
submit rules. Id. at 1132. He was also concerned that the Court did not write the rules and was a mere
conduit to Congress for their promulgation. Id. at 1133. Finally, he believed that the development of
the law of evidence is best left to a "case-by-case development by the courts or by Congress." Id. at
1132.
32. CARLSON, supra note 6, at 25.
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bill was signed by then President Gerald Ford. 33 The rules took effect
on July 1, 1975.34 However, to ensure that it would continue to have
supervisory power over the rules, Congress also passed a law which gives
either house of Congress veto power over the newly proposed rules. 35
IV. CODIFICATION: THE CASE IN FAVOR
The most powerful argument in favor of codification of the Federal
Rules is that they promote uniformity. 36 In addition to the federal
courts, thirty-five states, Puerto Rico, and the armed services have
adopted a version of the Federal Rules. 37 In construing their state codes,
courts in these jurisdictions tend to interpret their own rules similar to the
manner in which federal judges interpret the Federal Rules. 3 8 Even in
the states that have not adopted a code, the rules are influential. For instance, the Federal Rules are sometimes treated as persuasive authority, 39
or a particular Federal Rule will be incorporated into a particular state's
common law of evidence. 4 0
Uniformity, according to the proponents of the Federal Rules, is
crucial because it helps to promote justice. A major proponent of this
view is Professor Stephen Saltzburg. 4 1 According to Professor Saltzburg,
prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, every
practicing lawyer knew that when he or she walked into a
courtroom, having by lot drawn one particular judge, that
judge's own set of evidence rules was likely to be employed.
The same lawyer knew that when chance assigned another
judge to a case, a different set of evidence rules might well be
employed . . . . In some jurisdictions there were probably
almost as many sets of evidence rules as trial judges. 4 2
33. Id. at 25-26.
34. Id. at 26.
35. Id.
36. See Margaret A. Berger. The Federal Rules of Evidence; Defining and Refining the Goals of
Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 258-59 (1984).
37. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 3 n.2.
38. See id. at 27.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See generally Saltzburg, supra note 10.
42. See Saltzburg, supra note 10, at 189.
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Professor Saltzburg believes that codification has largely rectified this
problem.4 3
A second argument in favor of codification is that it has improved
the quality of the bench and the bar.4 4 According to the proponents:
the bench has improved because codification has forced judges
to talk to each other about rules of evidence and how they
should be applied. As a result of discussion and thought about
the Federal Rules, judicial rulings on evidence are likely to be
better and more informed than in pre-codification days.4 5
Proponents also believe that the bar has improved as a result of
codification. 4 6 Codification and the requirement by many states that
lawyers receive Continuing Legal Education credit ensure that lawyers
will continue to study the rules and will keep abreast of new developments concerning the Federal Rules. This has resulted in lawyers who
47
are more knowledgeable about the evidence rules.
Next, there is the'"pocket bible" argument in favor of codification. 4 8
According to this argument:
[N]o matter how well a lawyer prepares, in many situations
points of evidence law will arise during trial and will not have
been anticipated. When that happens, the lawyer needs to be
able to research the point quickly, or at least to fall back on a
body of law that is readily accessible,
given that during the middle of trial or deposition, there is little time for
research or reflection. 4 9 The Federal Rules of Evidence is such a body
50
of law and affords both the lawyer and judges easy access to the law.
43. Professor Saltzburg points out:
What the Federal Rules of Evidence establish is that the words "Equal Justice Under
Law," chiseled in stone on the front of the Supreme Court Building, are now chiseled into
everyday reality in every federal trial court in the nation. No longer will there be two,
three or ten sets of evidence rules depending on the number of judges that happen to sit
on a given bench. To the extent that we can do it and make it work, there will be one set
of evidence rules that will be applied uniformly throughout the United States . ...
Litigants rich or poor, wise or unwise, represented by retained counsel or by appointed
lawyers, all will know that the same evidence rules apply to each of them. This is no
small step in the march toward equal justice.
Saltzburg, supra note 10, at 190.
44. See Berger, supra note 36, at 258.
45. Saltzburg, supranote 10, at 186.
46. Id. at 186-87.
47. Id. at 186.
48. Id. at 184-85.
49. Id. at 184.
50. Id. at 184-85.
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Finally, proponents argue that codification leads to better decisions
because more evidence is made available to the trier of fact and the trial
judge is given sufficient discretion to do justice in a particular case.5 1
V.

CODIFICATION: THE CASE AGAINST
A.

UNIFORMITY

In declining to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded:
[P]romulgation of rules of evidence would tend to restrict the
development of common law principles pertaining to the
admissibility of evidence. The valid objective of uniformity of
practice in Federal and State courts would not necessarily ,be
advanced because the Proposed Rules, in their present form,
depart significantly from the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Additionally, in the view of some of the Justices, the Federal
Rules of Evidence have not led to uniform practice in the
various Federal courts and are, in some instances, less well
adapted to the needs of modern trial practice than current
52
Massachusetts law.

B.

JUSTICE?

Opponents of codification question whether the Federal Rules really
do promote justice as Professor Saltzburg so strongly asserts. 5 3 A case
can certainly be made that the Federal Rules invest too much discretion
in the trial judge, 54 and that as a result, litigants are no better able to
predict the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules than they
were able to do so prior to the Federal Rules.
Furthermore, certain classes of litigants face bias as a result of the
Federal Rules. Almost every Federal Rule of Evidence grants discretion
to the trial judge in admitting and excluding evidence. Several do so
outright. 55 Others permit the trial judge to balance the probative value
51. See Berger, supra note 36, at 269-70.
52. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15. at 5 (detailing the announcement of the Judicial
Court of Massachusetts concerning the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence (December 30,
1982)). The announcement went on, however, to suggest that the proposal being rejected had
"substantial value as a comparative standard" and that parties may "cite the Proposed Rules, wherever
appropriate, in briefs and memoranda." Id.
53. See generally Saltzburg, supra note 10.
54. See Richards S. Walinski & Howard Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The
Case Against, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 344, 367-86 (1978) (articulating the argument against the
proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence which were modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence).
55. Federal Rules 102, 103,403, 404, 412, 609, 611,614, 701, 702, 703, 705, 706, 803(6), 803(8),
803(24). 804(b)(5), and 1003 give enormous discretionary power to trial judges. See Saltzburg, supra
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of the evidence against its potential prejudicial effects. 5 6 Even those
rules which appear to be clear are often vague at the margins. 57 Furthermore, the harmless error rule enhances trial court discretion by directing
the appellate courts to give the trial court room to be wrong without
incurring reversal. 5 8 The enormous discretion given to trial judges may
59
substantially undermine the predictability rationale of the rules.
Opponents of codification further believe that discretion undermines the justice rationale of the rules. They point to studies, such as
those performed by Professor Eleanor Swift, which demonstrate that
certain classes of litigants achieve greater success in getting their evidence admitted than their adversaries. 60 Professor Swift analyzed the
successful use of certain hearsay evidence 6 1 by prosecutors, criminal
defendants, civil plaintiffs, and defendants. 6 2 In criminal cases, she
found that prosecutors were successful in seventy-four percent of the
cases in which they attempted to offer hearsay evidence. 63 In contrast,
64
criminal defendants were successful twenty-one percent of the time.
In civil cases, civil plaintiffs, frequently "underdogs seeking to
66
change the status quo," 65 were successful fifty-four percent of the time
whereas civil defendants, "who generally represent more established
economic and societal interests," 67 were successful in admitting hearsay
note 10, at 190. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has increased the trial judge's control
over the admission and use of expert witnesses with its decisions regarding the rules. Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993).
56. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 403.
57. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the FederalRules of Evidence, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 413, 446 (1989).
58. When an appellant raises an evidentiary error, Fed. R. Evid. 103 requires the reviewing court
to consider: (1) whether an erroneous ruling in admitting or excluding evidence was made below; (2)
whether this error was appropriately brought to the trial court's attention, either by objection or offer
of proof; and (3) whether a substantial right of a party was affected. If the court finds that no
substantial right of a party was affected, even though error occurred, it will not reverse and will term
the error "harmless." See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946). As a result of the
harmless error rule, trial judges' evidentiary rulings are rarely reversed. See Margaret A. Berger,
When if Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?,25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893 (1992).
59. See, e.g., Mengler, supra note 57, at 457.
60. Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has it Been Abolished DeFacto by Judicial
Decision, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473, 482-84 (1992).
61. Id. at 475. The categories of hearsay selected for study were Rules 803(I)-(4) and 803(6).
Id.
62. ld. at 481.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 483.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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evidence sixty-five percent of the time. 6 8 Critics of codification might
use these statistics to buttress their argument that justice has not been
achieved in the courtroom as a result of the Federal Rules. 6 9
C.

IMPROVEMENT OF THE BENCH AND BAR?

As to the argument that codification has improved the performance
of the bench and bar, opponents would respond that there hasn't been
any measurable improvement in either and would point to the fact that
complaints concerning the competency of lawyers have dramatically
increased since codification. 70
D.

POCKET BIBLE?

Opponents of codification might concede that the Federal Rules are
easily accessible to lawyers at trial but given the discretion judges are
accorded and the ambiguities of many of the rules, accessibility probably has not made a measurable difference in the courtroom.
E.

MORE EVIDENCE?

As to the contention that the trier of fact has been able to arrive at
better decisions because more evidence is available to them, opponents
would respond that the linking of discretion and liberality is misplaced
since trial judges, given so much flexibility, may exclude as easily as
admit evidence. 7 1
F. POOR DRAFTSMANSHIP AND APPLICATION
Another strong argument against codification is that the rules of
evidence were poorly drafted and that as a result they have led to incorrect and unjust application and that these problems undermine the
justification for the Federal Rules.
68. Id. at 481.
69. Id. at 483. However, Professor Swift provides as an explanation for this disparity the fact that
both criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs seek to admit their own statements as hearsay more often
and that these self-serving statements were precisely the type of statements that the hearsay rule was
designed to exclude. Id. at 486.
70. See Berger, supra note 36, at 261. However, it should be noted that this increase in
complaints could be attributed simply to the fact that since codification the number of lawyers has
dramatically increased.
71. See Mengler, supra note 57, at 413.
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As a result of the drafting problems, numerous rules need to be
revised. One such rule is Rule 407.72 This rule excludes evidence of
subsequent remedial measures as evidence of wrongdoing. 73 The rule
makes no mention of its applicability in products liability actions. Federal appeals courts have split on the question of whether the rule applies
in product liability cases. 74
The rule excluding character evidence 7 5 is also in need of revision.
First, it should be made clear that the rule applies to civil, as well as
criminal cases. Second, every exception to the rule should be articulated. 76 Finally, an assessment of section (b) of this rule is needed.7 7
Section (b) allows evidence of a party's prior crimes, wrongs and acts to
be admitted for almost any purpose other than to prove propensity.
These prior bad acts are admissible as long as "the jury can reasonably
conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor." 78
Section (b) has enabled prosecutors to present highly prejudicial
72. Rule 407 provides:
When after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made
the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment.
FED. R. EvID. 407.
73. Id.
74. See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 1, at 893-94.
75. Rule 404(a) provides:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same,
or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
rules 607, 608, and 609.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
76. For instance, an exception to the rule is contained in Rule405(b) for cases in which character
is an essential element of the charge, claim, or defense. See FED. R. EvID. 405(b).
77. Rule 404(b) as amended provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EvID. 404.
78. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1987).
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evidence of other alleged wrongdoing by criminal defendants. As a
result, it has received an enormous amount of scholarly criticism 7 9 and
generates more appeals than any other rule. 80
Rule 412, the rape shield statute, 8 1 has a couple of flaws. First, the
rule does not permit the prosecution or victims in civil cases to introduce
evidence of the victim's sexual history. 82 Since the rule was enacted for
the purpose of protecting alleged victims of sexual misconduct, 83 there
is no reason why the prosecution or victim should not be allowed to
introduce such evidence when it would buttress the victim's credibility. 8 4
Also, the rule makes no provision as to prior "false" allegations of
79. Numerous proposals to reform section (b) have been made. Among the many suggestions are
proposals to: (1) amend Rule 404 to restore the clear-and-convincing standard, see Federal Rules of
Evidence: A Fresh Review and Evaluation, 120 F.R.D. 299, 330 (1988); (2) amend section (b) to
burden prosecutors with showing that probative value outweighs prejudice, see Edward J.
lmwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the Future of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1497 (1985); (3) pay more attention to the issue of
fairness to the accused since the general propensity argument cannot be effectively refuted even
though it may not be right in any particular case, see Gilen Weissenberger, Making Sense of Extrinsic
Act Evidence: Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 70 IOWA L. REV. 579,611 (1985); and (4) admit only
those prior acts that are distinguished by their unusual nature or regular occurrence so they really do
show "predisposition tobehave in a similar fashion under similar circumstances," see Richard Uviller,
Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 845, 886-89 (1982).
80. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 488.
81. Rule 412 as amended provides in pertinent part:
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any
civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided
,in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual
behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise
admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim
offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of
semen, injury or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim
with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by
the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of
the defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible
under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of
harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an
alleged victim's reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in
controversy by the alleged victim.
FED. R. EvtD. 412
82. Id.
83. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee note.
84. Some state rules permit the prosecution to offer such evidence. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §
1103(a)(2) (West 1995).
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sexual assault by the victim. Guidance is needed as to whether such
prior allegations are admissible and under what circumstances these
allegations are to be considered "false." 85
The residual hearsay exceptions8 6 are also crying out for either abolition or revision. These exceptions permit the introduction of an outof-court assertion even though the hearsay does not fit within a class
exception upon a showing that the statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.8 7 Trial judges have undermined the legislative
intent by routinely admitting hearsay, such as grand jury testimony,
which was specifically excluded from the admission as a hearsay exception.8 8 As one commentator has correctly stated: "[T]he drafters never
intended that a trial judge admit hearsay under the residual exception
whenever he believed it necessary and reliable or true. Rather, only hearsay comparable to the hearsay permitted under a specific exception was
to be admitted." 89
Rule 410, which governs plea bargaining in criminal cases, also
needs revision. The rule is vague on the question of whether plea discussions with agents for the prosecutor are protected 9 0 and whether the
government's plea discussions with the defendant are also protected. 9 1
85. According to F.B.I. crime statistics, 8.4% of all reported rapes turn out to be "unfounded."
See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF
RESPONSIBILITY 275 (1994). That percentage translates into more than 8,000 false rape reports each
year. Id. at 275. Some state rape shield statutes provide for the admission of prior false allegations of
sexual misconduct and could serve as a model for the Federal Rules. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

12 § 2412(B)(2) (West 1995).
86. The residual hearsay exceptions are Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) and 804(b)(5). Federal Rule
804(b)(5) states in pertinent part:
(B) HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
...(5) OTHER EXCEPTIONS. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by the
admission of the statement into evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
87. Id.
88. See Randolf N. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual Hearsay Exceptions, CircumstantialGuaranteesof Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testimony, 36 CASE W. R ES. L.
REV. 431,441-62 (1986).
89. Id. at 440.
90. Rule 410 protects from admission "any statement made in the course of plea discussions with
an attorneyfor the prosecutingauthority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea
of guilty later withdrawn." FED. R. EVID. 410 (emphasis added).
91. Rule 410 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following
is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant." FED. R. EvID. 410
(emphasis added).
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Additional needed clarifications are: 1) whether the trial judge has
the authority under Rule 403 to exclude evidence made explicitly admissible by another rule; 9 2 2) the definition of "predecessor in interest"
under the former testimony hearsay exception; 9 3 3) the confusion
created by excluding prior statements and party admissions from the
hearsay rule; 94 and finally, 4) the rules governing expert testimony need
to be reconciled with the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
95
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
VI. ALTERNATIVES
Since many of the criticisms of codification appear to have some
merit, at this point it is appropriate to consider some alternatives to
codification. The possibilities range from the civil law system's "free
evaluation of the evidence," which gives almost total discretion to the
trial judge, to one which allows the trial judge almost no discretion. The
civil law systems which will be considered as possible alternatives are
France, which employs a system of wide open admissibility and which
invests total discretion to the trial judge, and Germany, which employs a
system involving a limited number of exclusionary rules with discretion
for the most part remaining with the trial judge. Finally, rules of evidence which are more detailed than the present system and which
attempt to divest the trial judge of any discretion will be analyzed.
A.

AN OVERVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS

A typical civil proceeding in a civil law jurisdiction is divided into
three stages:
There is a brief preliminary stage, in which the pleadings are
submitted and a hearing judge appointed; an evidence taking
stage, in which the hearing judge takes the evidence and
prepares a summary written record; and a decision-making
stage, in which the judges who will decided the case consider
92. Federal Rule 403 excludes evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. FED. R. EvID. 403. However, courts are in disagreement as to whether
hearsay statements which fall within the parameters of an exception may be excluded pursuant to Rule
403. See United States v. DiMara, 727 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that hearsay evidence
cannot be excluded if it satisfies an exception); United States v. Mandel, 437 F. Supp. 262 (D. Md.
1977) (stating that evidence can be excluded even though it satisfies the requirements of a specific
hearsay exception).
93. Federal Rule 804(b)(1) admits testimony of an unavailable witness in a civil case if the party
against whom the testimony is offered, or his predecessor in interest, possessed a similar motive and
opportunity to cross examine the witness. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
94. It has been suggested that these should be made hearsay exceptions instead. See Rice, The
Evidence Project of the American University Washington College of Law.
95. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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the record transmitted to them by the hearing judge, receive
counsel's briefs, hear their arguments and render decisions. 96
Civil trials in civil law countries are profoundly different from their
common law counterparts. First, a civil proceeding in a civil law country
is "actually a series of isolated meetings of and written communications
between counsel and the judge in which evidence is introduced, testimony is given and procedural motions and rulings are made." 9 7 In contrast, in the United States, for instance, although the series of meetings
and written communications between counsel share some similarities to
the discovery process, the presentation of evidence is usually concentrated in one proceeding. Second, in civil law countries, evidence is received
and a summary record is prepared by someone other than the judge who
will decide the case, whereas, in common law countries, the same individual performs both tasks. 98
The handling of testifying witnesses is also a major contrast between
civil and common law systems. In civil law systems, testifying witnesses
are questioned by the hearing judge rather than by counsel for the
parties. 99 Furthermore, witnesses are not subject to intense cross-examination as in common law systems.300 "The hearing judge makes notes
of a witness' testimony and dictates a summary to the clerk. After the
witness and lawyers agree about the accuracy of the summary, the
summary will enter the record that goes to the deciding panel of
judges."o' Since the deciding judges are never afforded an opportunity to observe a testifying witness' demeanor, sincerity, or recollection,
and since interested witness' parties, relatives, and interested third
persons are disqualified from testifying as witnesses, there is little need to
discredit witnesses. 102
There is also "free evaluation of the evidence" by deciding judges.
This means that in contrast to common law systems, there are virtually no
exclusionary rules of evidence. 103 This point will be discussed in -greater
detail later in this paper. The most likely explanation for this distinction
between civil and criminal law systems is the absence of juries in civil
actions in civil law jurisdictions.104
96. See J. MERRYMAN, ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA
1014 (1994).
97. Id. at 1014-15.
98. Id. at 1015.
99. id. at 1016. Counsel for the parties can, however, submit written questions to the judge to be
asked of the witness. Id.
100. id. at 1017.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1018.
104. Id.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS

A civil law criminal proceeding has three stages: "the investigative
phase, the examining phase, and the trial." 10 5 The public prosecutor
conducts the investigative phase.106 The examining phase is analogous
to the grand jury proceeding or preliminary hearing in the United States.
A record of all the evidence is made and then there is a determination as
to whether the defendant should stand trial for the crime. 107 The defen08
dant can refuse to answer questions during this phase.1
The criminal trial in civil law jurisdictions is different in character
from the common law trial. In civil law jurisdictions, the main function
of the criminal trial "is to present [the] evidence to the judge and jury
and to allow the prosecutor and the defendant's counsel to argue their
cases," 109 whereas in common law countries a major function of the trial
is to make a record for appellate review. Although witnesses, including
the defendant, can be questioned, as in civil proceedings, the questions
are put to the witness by the judge and there is no developed system of
cross-examination comparable to common law jurisdictions. 110 Furthermore, like civil proceedings, there are virtually no exclusionary rules of
evidence.IIl Although there are juries in civil law criminal proceedings,
these juries are usually composed of a mixture of professional judges
and lay jurors. 1 12
Finally, victims in most civil law jurisdictions are permitted, but not
required, to join in the criminal proceeding.11 3 Although civil parties
will be represented by their own lawyer, the main burden of the proceeding will fall on the public prosecutor.' 14 If the defendant's guilt is
established by the prosecution, the civil party only has to prove causation
and damages.1 15 Thus, civil law courts deal with guilt, liability, sentence,
and remedy all in the same proceeding.It 6
105. id. at 1064.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1065.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Pleafor Utilizing Foreign
Experience, 26 BuFF. L. REV. 361, 367 (1977).
112. See MERRYMAN, supra note 96, at 1066.
113. Id. at 1073 (noting that Germany is the exception).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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1. No Rules
One possible alternative to codification is a system which employs
almost no technical rules concerning the admissibility of evidence,
leaving decisions concerning the admissibility of evidence totally in the
hands of the trial judge. This is the system presently employed in
France and in International Tribunals.
In contrast to the United States, there is no law of evidence in
France. l 7 French trial courts are bound by very few legal restrictions on
the nature of evidence they may receive. Typical is Article 427 of the
French Code of Criminal Procedure:
[1] Except when the law provides otherwise, offenses may be
established by any manner of proof, and the judge shall
decide according to his thorough conviction.
[2] The judge may found his decision only on the evidence
that is brought to him in the course of the trial and
discussed before him by the parties.li8
As a result of the absence of formal rules governing the form or
scope of admissible evidence, the trial judge in France has complete discretion in this regard. Thus evidence which would normally be excluded
in the United States (evidence bearing on the accused's prior convictions, general behavior, family history, hearsay testimony, and documentary evidence) is freely admitted."1 9 The trial judge's discretion is
further enhanced by the fact that although all issues of law and fact are
appealable by both the prosecution and the defense, criminal appeals in
France are extremely rare. 120 The trial judge's evidentiary rulings are,
therefore, for the most part final.
Several factors explain the absence of evidence rules in France.
First and foremost, fact-finding in France is dominated by professional
judges, not lay jurors. 121 The participation of judges in fact finding
117. See RENP DAVID, FRENCH LAW 146 (1972).
118. See GERALD KOCK & RICHARD FRASE, THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 199 (rev.

ed. 1988).
119. See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform:
How Do the French Do it, How Can We Find Out and Why Should We Care?, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 539,
677 (1990).
120. Id. at 682. Reasons for the infrequency of defense appeals are that they usually provoke a
prosecution cross-appeal, thus permitting the defendant's sentence to be increased and the fact that
the defendant will be ordered to pay costs if the court finds that his or her appeal was not well
founded. Id. at 682 n.742.
121. Id. at 678. In all but one French court, verdicts are rendered by professional judges; in the
Cour d'Assises, decisions are rendered by a twelve person jury, composed of three professional
judges and a lay jury of nine. See Nicholas R. Doman, Aftermath of Nuremberg: The Trial of Klaus
Barbie, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 449, 449 n.2 (1989).
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tends to ensure that inflammatory evidence is not misused in the deliberation process. Furthermore, in contrast to the United States, where there
is a series of evidentiary rules governing cross examination and other
means of discrediting witnesses, 1 22 there is no cross examination in
France. Thus, the absence of cross-examination helps to. explain the
absence of exclusionary rules.
Another explanation for the absence of evidence rules in France is
that trial procedure is not divided into separate guilt and sentencing
phases, so that all evidence bearing on sentencing must be admitted at
the same time as evidence bearing on guilt. In addition, the absence of
evidence rules maximizes the amount of information available to the fact
finder. Finally, as to both guilt and sentence, the French believe that it is
better to judge the whole person, not just his current situation "[o]ne
123
judges the man, not the acts."
Similarly, international tribunals do not employ formal rules of
evidence.124 Rather, trial judges are given almost total discretion and
evidence is routinely admitted.125 Typical is the following provision
from the Nuremberg charter: "The tribunal shall not be bound by
technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest
possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedures and shall
admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value." 126
There are several rationales behind this policy of routine admissibility by international tribunals. First, decisions in international tribunals
usually affect thousands of people along with relations between
nation-states. 127 The court is therefore reluctant to allow a case to turn
upon a technical rule of evidence or procedure. 128 Second, there is the
belief that rules of evidence inhibit the ascertainment of the truth. 12 9
Third, international tribunals have generally incurred tremendous
difficulties in obtaining evidence and do not want to limit the evidence
122. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 607, 608, 609, 610, and 613.
123. See George W. Pugh, The Administration of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory
Analysis, 23 LA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1962).
124. See DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 8-15 (rev. ed.
1975).
125. Id.
126. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, ch. 5, 59 Stat. 1544, 1551 (1945).
127. See SANDIFER, supra note 124, at 4-5.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 6. This principle was stated in the Oscar Chinn Case by the Permanent Court of International Justice: "The Court is not tied to any system of taking evidence.., its task is to cooperate in
the objective ascertainment of the truth." Id. at 7.
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available to them. 130 Finally, the fact that decisions are rendered by
professional judges as opposed to lay jurors is an important factor. 131
2.

Limited Rules

Another possible alternative to the present Federal Rules of Evidence would be to adopt a limited number of evidence rules which is designed to deal with frequent evidence problems but which would otherwise invest the trial judge with authority in admitting and excluding
evidence. The German system is a good illustration.
The German system is somewhere between the French system,
which routinely admits all evidence, and the American system, with its
detailed exclusionary rules. Like France, there's a general rule of admissibility in Germany: "In order to search out the truth the court shall on
its own motion extend the taking of evidence to all facts and means of
proof that are important for the decision."132
However, there are limits to the general rule of admissibility. First,
the Germans have an analogue to the Anglo-American hearsay rule: "If
the evidence of a fact is based upon a person's observation, this person
shall be examined at trial. The examination may not be replaced by
reading the record of an earlier examination or by reading a written
statement." 133
However, documentary evidence is still important in Germany.1 34
"Prior examinations are admissible when a witness has died, become ill,
or is otherwise hindered from appearing. Documentary evidence may
also be used by the court to refresh the recollection of a witness or to
contradict the testimony of a witness or an accused."135 Finally, the
German hearsay rule is limited to observation evidence.1 36 "Thus, a
variety of public records, such as birth certificates and prior judicial or
minor medical matters, including blood type or blood alcohol content,
may also be received; and summaries or police or prosecutor's pretrial
examination of the accused and witnesses are available to the court."' 137
Second, the German code grants a variety of privileges to refuse to
testify, including those of the spouse, ex-spouse, fiancee, relatives (to the
130.
note 133,
131.
132.
133.

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at22. For some of the reasons contributing to the difficulties in obtaining evidence, see
at 24-29.
See infra note 132, at12.
See JOHN H. LANOBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 69 (1977).
Id. at 67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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third degree of consanguinity), clergyman, and attorneys. 138 The privileges are so strong that a holder of a privilege can even prevent the
139
admission of his or her pre-trial statements.
40
German courts can also refuse to hear irrelevant evidence.1
Evidence is irrelevant if it:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

is superfluous because the matter is common knowledge;
has already been proven or is important;
is inappropriate or unobtainable;
is meant to delay the proceeding; or
if the proposition to be proved would benefit the accused and
the court is prepared to take it as though it were true without
proof. 14

1

The final matter which German exclusionary rules deal with is prior
convictions. Prior convictions are used only if they are important for the
decision and they are usually admitted because they are important to the
issue of sentencing.14 2 Because prior convictions are usually important
43
for the issue of sentencing, they usually are revealed.1
Although German practice concerning prior convictions is remarkably different from American practice, where the general rule subject to
significant exceptions is to withhold prior conviction evidence from the
trier for fear of its prejudiciality,1 44 two notable German rules governing
the use of criminal records lessen the sting of prior conviction evidence.
First, German law provides that criminal records be systematically
expunged after the lapse of certain time periods. 145 Second, arrest
records are not admissible.14 6
The Germans prefer their system of limited exclusionary rules as
opposed to the more detailed alternative employed by the United States.
They believe that the potential damaging effects -of inflammatory
evidence which are, for the most part, excluded in the United States can
be overcome by having professional judges serve on juries with lay
138. Id. at 70.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 1 believe that what (5) excludes is unreliable evidence. See id. at 70.
142. Id. at 70. Proceedings in Germany are not bifurcated as they are in many American
jurisdictions.
143. Id. at 76-77.
144. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403, 404(a), 410. However, these protections are limited by Federal
Rules 404(b), 607, 608, 609, and 613.
145. See LANGBEIN, supra note 132, at 77.
146. Id. One observer commented about the contrast between the American and German use of
arrest records: "Continental visitors will be astonished at the significance attached in America to such
records. In their countries, very little, if any, significance is attached to records of arrest." Id. at 77.
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and by requiring that the triers of fact state reasons for their

MORE DETAIL

The final alternative to the current rules of evidence would be a
system with even more detailed rules. In 1942, Professor John Wigmore
proposed such a code. 148 Professor Wigmore's code was so detailed that
it consisted of 242 rules and 544 pages. 149 He believed that an evidence
code should not leave unfettered discretion in the hands of trial
judges.150 Professor Wigmore warned that when vast discretion is
handed to the trial judge on evidentiary matters, predictability of
51
decisions is necessarily lost and uncertainty in litigation is increased.1
An illustration of the detail provided in Professor Wigmore's code
would be in the area of privileges. There are privileges for trade
15 5
secrets, 152 official secrets, 153 theological beliefs, 154 political votes,
158
57
spousal testimony,1 5 6 spousal communications,1 self-incrimination,
attorney-client communication, 159 petit jurors, 16 0 grand juries,161 public
prosecutors and other officials,16 2 official secrets,163 patient-physician
communications, 164 and penitent-priest communications. 165 In addition,
the conditions of each privilege are spelled out in great detail. In contrast, there is only one federal rule concerning privileges.1 66 It is a one
paragraph statement directing the courts to recognize those privileges
147. The Germans employ a "mixed" court consisting of professional judges and lay juries. In
some courts, lay jurors outnumber professional judges. In others, professional judges outnumber lay
judges.
148. J. WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1942).
149. Id.
150. See J. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent, 28 A.B.A.
J. 23, 24 (1942).
151. Id. at 24.
152. J. WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 206, § 2273.
153. id. § 2275.
154. Id. § 2276.
155. Id. § 2277.
156. Id. at Rule 207.
157. Id. at Rule 211.
158. Id. at Rule 208.
159. Id. at Rule 210.
160. Id. at Rule 210.
161. Id.at Rule 212.
162. Id.at Rule 214.
163. Id. at Rule 215.
164. Id. at Rule 216.
165. Id. at Rule 217.
166. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
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which existed at common law and to apply local privileges in diversity
cases. 167
Proponents of a more detailed system would use the federal rule
concerning privileges to buttress their concern that too much discretion
has been given to the trial judge. As a result of the Federal Rule, judges
have had to decide which privileges are to be recognized 168 and the extent of their coverage. 169 Furthermore, inconsistency is created by referring to state law in diversity cases. 170 Proponents believe that a more
detailed code might eliminate these types of problems.
VII. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
This paper has discussed some of the weaknesses of the current
Federal Rules and presented three alternatives: no rules, limited rules, or
more detailed rules of evidence. The following is an assessment of each
of the different options.
A. No RULES
A system with no limitations on the admissibility of evidence, as
employed in France and in International Tribunals, has several advantages. First, the fact finder is able to consider all relevant information in a
particular case without being handcuffed by rules of evidence. Second,
the absence of evidence rules might lessen or eliminate the problem of
witness intimidation. 17 1 In France, for instance, pretrial statements may
be used in court for substantive evidentiary purposes.1 72 As a result,
witnesses cannot change their testimony at trial, or if they do, their
167. Federal Rule 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the constitution of the United States or provided by an
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501. When the Advisory Committee drafted the Federal Rules, the committee included
12 detailed statutes devoted to privilege. However, Congress balked at enacting those statutes and
only enacted Rule 501. See CARLSON supra note 6, at 732.
168. See CARLSON supra note 6, at 732.
169. See id.
170. FED. R. EvID. 501.
171. Witness intimidation by gang members has become a serious problem in the United States.
For instance, in recent testimony before a Congressional committee, prosecutors in Washington, D.C.
said that the city was failing to pursue 30 to 35% of its murder cases because people with knowledge
of events refused to cooperate. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Gang Intimidation Takes Rising Toll on
Court Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994, at 1.
172. Frase, supra note 119, at 678.
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previous testimony will be admitted as substantive evidence. 173 Thus,
there will be little motivation to bribe or intimidate potential witnesses. 174
In contrast, pretrial statements are generally inadmissible under the
Federal Rules.175 Finally, the relaxation of trial evidence rules might
reduce dependence on plea bargaining.' 76 Without evidence rules, trial
time might not be spent by attorneys attempting to manipulate evidence
rules and arguing about the exclusion of evidence. 177 As a result, trials
would be of shorter duration and cases could be tried rather than plea
bargained.1 78
This system is successful in France and in the International Tribunals since most decisions are rendered by professional judges as opposed
to lay jurors. Even when lay jurors participate in fact finding professional judges are there to steer the jury away from basing its decisions on
inflammatory evidence. Because the jury is such an integral part of the
American system,1 7 9 a system which employed no rules of evidence
would be unworkable in the United States. Juries simply cannot be
trusted with inflammatory evidence. 180
Another reason why the French system should not be adopted in the
United States is that it allows too much inquiry into an individual's
past.181 This flies in the face of the American ideal that individuals are
capable of rehabilitation. Furthermore, studies have demonstrated the
unreliability of character evidence as a predictor of future behavior. A
leading study on the issue concluded that:
First, behavior depends on stimulus situation and is
specific to the situation; response patterns even in highly
similar situations often fail to be strongly related. Individuals
show far less cross-situational consistency in their behavior
than has been assumed by strait state theories. The more
173. See Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 519-20 (1973).
174. Id. n.20.
175. Most pretrial statements are hearsay and are excluded from evidence as a result. FED. R.
EVID. 802.

176. See Frase, supra note 119, at 678.
177. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U Cm. L. REV. 931, 993 (1983).
178. Id. at 993.
179. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in pertinent part: "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. The Seventh Amendment states in pertinent part: "[i]n Suits at common law where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S.
CONsT. amend. V11.
180. See Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code
Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1003, 1008-09
(1984).
181. Frase, supra note 119, at 677.
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dissimilar the evoking situations, the less likely they are to lead
to similar or consistent responses from the same individual.
Even seemingly trivial situational differences may reduce
1 82
correlation to zero.
Finally, jurors tend to place too much weight on evidence of bad
83
conduct.1
A further problem with the French system is the fact that "relaxed
trial evidence rules might ...encourage prosecutors to file more weak
cases, thereby increasing court congestion and the need for plea bargaining."' 184 Finally, certain evidence rules are constitutionally required.
For instance, the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause 185 necessitates
a hearsay rule.1 86 Although the absence of rules of admissibility seems
well suited for France, a similar system simply would not work in the
United States.
B.

LIMITED RULES

The German system of limited evidence rules is an attractive alternative. It puts judges on notice as to that evidence which is less desirable
and which should be excluded while at the same time permitting the
judge some flexibility to tailor the evidence to a particular case.
The German system works because of the participation of professional judges in the fact finding and deliberation process. Unlike the
French system, in Germany, lay jurors play an integral role in fact
finding. However, even though lay jurors participate in fact finding,
professional judges deliberate along with them.18 7 The presiding judge
88
leads the deliberations, puts questions before the jury, and takes votes.1
Thus, the presiding judge, along with two associate judges, is present and
89
can ensure that evidence is not misused.1
The participation of professional judges in the deliberation process
cannot be overstated. For instance, in one German case involving a
182. See Mendez, supra note 180, at 1052.
183. Id. at 1006-07.
184. See Frase, supra note 119, at 678.
185. The Sixth Amendment states in pertinent part that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
186. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1979) ("The historical evidence leaves little doubt,
however, that the [confrontation] Clause was intended to exclude some hearsay").
187. LANGBEIN, supra note 132, at 63.
188. Id. at 80.
189. For instance, one study of the German system found that lay jurors differed on the outcome
of cases in only 1.4% of cases from their professional counterparts. See John H. Langbein, Mixed
Court and Jury Court: Could the ContinentalAlternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FouND.
RES. J. 195, 197-205 (1981). In contrast, American juries differed from the presiding judge 22% of
the time. Id. at 204.
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dispute between a prostitute and her pimp, the pimp was charged with a
variety of offenses and acquitted of all charges. 190 However, one of the
lay jurors wanted to convict.191 In this juror's mind, the defendant's lifestyle was sufficient to establish the offense.192 The lay juror eventually
abandoned his position, persuaded by the judges' emphasis on the
presumption of innocence. 193
The German system, like the French system, would not work in the
United States. The presence of professionals in deliberations and the
requirement of written findings of fact and law are sufficient safeguards
against the misuse of potentially prejudicial evidence. However, the
absence of similar safeguards in the American deliberation process to
guard against the misuse of inflammatory evidence ensures that a
German type system would not work in the United States. Furthermore,
like the French system, the German system permits too much of the
defendant's past to be put on trial.
C.

MORE DETAIL

Proponents of a more detailed system believe that it would better
promote predictability by making evidence rules more precise. Both
attorneys and judges would have a good grasp of the rules prior to trial
and the rules could therefore be applied in a consistent manner. The
attorneys would know before they step into the courtroom which evidence will be admitted and which will be excluded. In addition, a more
detailed code would largely eliminate the trial judge's discretion in
admitting and excluding evidence.
D.

SUMMARY

Because of the importance of the jury in the United States and the
lack of safeguards against the misuse of inflammatory evidence, the
French and German systems of general admissibility are not viable
options to the Federal Rules of Evidence. In addition, Americans would
not be comfortable investing their trial judges with the amount of discretion given French and German trial judges in determining the admissibility of evidence. Thus, the only viable alternative would be a more
detailed code along the line that Professor Wigmore proposed.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See Langbein, supra note 189, at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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VIII. MORE DETAILED CODE VS. THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE
An assessment must now be made as to whether the United States
should adopt a more detailed evidence code or should the Federal Rules
of Evidence be retained.
A.

MORE DETAIL

The strongest argument in favor of a more detailed code, in addition to predictability, is that a more detailed code would largely eliminate
the trial judge's discretion in admitting and excluding evidence.
Opponents of discretion believe that it has a profound negative impact
on the justice system in that it allows judges to decide similar situations
differently. Discretion instructs the judge to announce the result he or
she wants or thinks just, not the result that the rule of law, through its
centuries of evolution and development, teaches is the appropriate result
for those conditions and circumstances. Furthermore, in a society with
deeply rooted racial, ethnic, class and other divisions, biased judges are
inevitable and discretion increases the likelihood that these biases will be
reflected in the courtroom. As a result, a system which limits the trial
judge's discretion may be more desirable since it is more likely to
produce justice and predictability.
However, attempts have been made before to eliminate discretion in
other areas. These attempts have proven to be largely unsuccessful.
Two prominent areas for comparison are the United States Sentencing
Guidelines and capital punishment.
1.

Sentencing Guidelines

In 1984, the United States Congress passed the Sentencing Reform
Act. 19 4 Congress had two primary goals when it enacted the new federal
sentencing statute. 195 First, Congress wanted "honesty in sentencing." 196 "Honesty in sentencing" is designed to ensure that "the sentence the judge gives is the sentence the offender will serve." 19 7 "Since
release by the Parole Commission in such circumstances was likely, but
not inevitable, this system sometimes fooled the judges, sometimes
disappointed the offender, and often misled the public." 198
194. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988).
195. Id.
196. id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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Congress' second purpose was to reduce "unjustifiably wide" sentencing disparities between the federal circuits. 199 For instance, Congress
was presented with evidence showing:
The region in which the defendant is convicted is likely to
change the length of time served from approximately six
months more if one is sentenced in the South to twelve months
less if one is sentenced in Central California . . . [Flemale bank
robbers are likely to serve six months less than their similarly
situated counterparts . . . [and] black [bank robbery] defendants convicted . . . in the South are likely to actually serve
approximately thirteen months longer than similarly situated
bank robbers convicted . . in other regions. 20 0
"To remedy [both] problems, Congress created the United States
Sentencing Commission, comprised of seven members (including three
federal judges) appointed by the President [and] confirmed by the
Senate." 20 1 The Commission proceeded to write Sentencing Guidelines
which would take the form of a grid that determines sentencing in light
of characteristics of the offense and of the offender. 2 02 The Guideline
sentences consist of a range, the top of which range cannot exceed the
bottom by more than twenty-five percent. 2 03 The judge might depart
from the Guideline range, but in doing so, he or she must explain why
and the imposed sentence is subject to appellate review for reasonableness. 2 04 The Commission serves as a permanent body, continuously revising the Guidelines over the years as circumstances change or conditions
may warrant. 205
While it is true that the trial judges' discretion in sentencing has
been severely limited as a result of the guidelines, this discretion has
simply been transferred to other law enforcement officials. 20 6 Furthermore, not only has the disparity in sentencing failed to diminish, it has in
many cases increased. 2 07
The Guidelines have shifted sentencing power and discretion away
from the trial judge to the probation officer and prosecutor. 2 0 8 The
199. Id.
200. Id. at 5.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 5-6.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
206. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 161, 163 (1991).
207. Id. at 165.
208. Id. at 163.
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probation officer is responsible for preparing a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) after a defendant pleads guilty or is convicted at trial. 20 9
In a majority of cases, the court accepts the findings and recommendations contained in the PSI.210 The prosecutor exercises discretion by
determining whom should be charged and what the charge should be.2 11
In addition, the time to be served by an offender is largely determined
by the prosecutor since the probation officer, in preparing a PSI, relies
heavily on the information in the prosecutor's file. 2 12
Disparities in sentencing continue despite the guidelines. First,
disparities exist between judicial district. A recent study of sentencing in
four judicial districts in the Eighth Circuit revealed:
the percentage of defendants pleading guilty ranged [between
districts] from seventy-three to eighty-seven; the average
sentence for those pleading guilty ranged from 23.9 to 41.8
months; the percentage of defendants pleading guilty who
receive a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility
ranged from fifty-four to eighty-six; the percentage of those
pleading guilty who were sentenced in the lower quartile of the
guidelines varied from fifty-eight to sixty-seven; the percent of
those pleading guilty who were sentenced in the upper quartile
of the guidelines range varied from sixteen to thirty; and the
percentage of those pleading guilty who received sentences of
probation only ranged from eleven to twenty-two. 2 13
One of the primary goals of the Guidelines was to eliminate racial
disparities in sentencing. 2 14 However, racial disparities in sentencing
continue to exist. Prior to the Guidelines, blacks served approximately
forty-five months compared to thirty-five months for whites. 2 15 After
the Guidelines, blacks serve approximately seventy-four months whereas
whites serve about thirty-seven months. 2 16 In addition, black and Hispanic males receive sentences of straight probation less frequently than
white males. 2 17
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 172-75.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 172-73.
Id. at 202.
See Palicido G. Gomez, The Dilenima of Difference: Race as a Sentencing Factor, 24
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 357 (1994).
215. See Heaney, supra note 206, at 208.
216. Id. Factors contributing to longer sentences for black offenders include law enforcement's
emphasis on curtailing crack cocaine, and the guidelines' mandatory consideration of prior criminal
convictions. Id. at 206.
217. Id. at 208.
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Congress had hoped that the Guidelines would eliminate discretion
and disparity in sentencing. As the earlier discussion demonstrates, the
Guidelines have accomplished neither. 2 18 The Guidelines have increased
the volume of criminal cases 2 19 and the time served by federal convicts. 2 20 As a result, strains have been placed upon the criminal justice
system. 22 1
2.

Capital Punishment

In Furman v. Georgia,2 22 a five to four majority of the United States
Supreme Court held that capital punishment, as then administered,
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. 2 2 3 Three of the five justices in the majority felt that the
fatal flaw with capital punishment was the arbitrary and discriminatory
manner in which it has traditionally been imposed. 2 24
Despite the fact that it subsequently reinstated the death penalty, 225
the Court has struggled to ensure that the death penalty is imposed
"fairly and with reasonable consistency." 2 26 To this end, the Court has
218. Judge Heaney, the Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, concludes that "these guidelines have not eliminated 'disparities' and that no set of guidelines,
no matter how faithfully applied, can do so, so long as human beings law enforcement agents,
prosecutors, probation officers and judges must make decisions affecting the liberty of human beings."
See id. at 202-03; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991). But see U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM
IMPACTS ON D ISPARITY IN S ENTENCING, U SE OF INCARCERATION, AND P ROSECUTION D ISCRETION AND P LEA
BARGAINING, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1991) (concluding that Guidelines substantially reduced

unwarranted sentencing disparity); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the FederalSentencing Process:
The Problem is Uniformity Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833 (1992) (concluding that the
Guidelines have decreased disparity but conceding that there are real problems with excessive
uniformity and with evasion and manipulation).
219. See Henry J. Reske, Judges Irked by Tough-On-Crime Laws, 80 A.B.A. J. 18 (1994).
220. See Fox Butterfield, More in U.S. Are in Prisons, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1995, at
-A14.
221. For instance, a recent survey of federal judges found that 72.8% of appellate judges and
57.1% of district judges found the volume of criminal cases either a "large" or "grave" problem. See
Reske, supra note 219, at 18.
222. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
223. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972).
224. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10. Reflecting this sentiment, Justice Stewart said:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lighting is cruel and unusual ....
[I]f any basis can be discerned for the selection of
these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race. But
racial discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one side. I simply conclude that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of
death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed.
Id. (Douglas, J., and White, J., concurring).
225. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
226. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
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attempted to confine the sentencer's discretion to impose death. 2 2 7
However, despite this attempt, the death penalty continues to be imposed
in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
In McClesky v. Kemp, 2 2 8 the defendant, an African-American,
argued that the Georgia capital sentencing scheme was administered in a
racially discriminatory manner, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 22 9 In support of his claim, he proffered a highly reliable
statistical study 2 30 which indicated that "after taking into account some
230 nonracial factors that might legitimately influence a sentencer, the
jury more likely than not would have spared [the defendant's] life had
his victim been black." 231 The Baldus study demonstrated that "blacks
who kill whites are sentenced to death at nearly 22 times the rate of
blacks who kill blacks."232 Additionally, the death penalty is more
likely to be meted out to poorer defendants who cannot afford an
attorney but who instead must rely on court-appointed counsel. 2 33
Justice Blackmun, who attempted during his tenure on the court to
ensure that capital punishment be carried out in a consistent, fair, and
reasonable manner, 234 recently conceded the inherent impossibility of
doing so:
I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede
that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually
self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural
rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty
from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic question-does the system accurately and consistently determine
which defendants "deserve" to die?---cannot be answered in
the affirmative. 235
The apparent failures of the Sentencing Commission and the
Supreme Court to eliminate discretion and disparity in sentencing and
capital punishment, respectively, demonstrate that a more detailed code
of evidence rules isn't any more likely to produce fairness than the
227. See Furman,408 U.S. at 239-40.
228. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
229. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
230. Known as the Baldus study, it was "performed by Professors David C. Baldus, Charles
Pulaski and George Woodworth that purports to show a disparity in the imposition of the death
sentence in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the
defendant." Id.
231. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 327.
233. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
butfor the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835 (1994).
234. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1161 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 1168.
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present Federal Rules of Evidence. The solution is not simply to eliminate discretion. Rather, the solution is to work towards transforming
those deeply rooted attitudes and prejudices which are responsible for
producing those disparities. Furthermore, a detailed code may result in
rules which are too mechanical. There is a risk that judges will become
what Justice Benjamin Cardoz0 2 36 described as "pharmacists;" rules
would become neat formulas for judges to apply, as opposed to rules
2 37
which permit creativity in fitting them to a particular trial.
Proponents such as Professor Wigmore would respond that detailed
rules would serve as "guides, not chains." 2 38 Judges are given, some
discretion in working with the rules. In particular, there are provisions
which allow judges to comment on the evidence,2 39 make the judge's
rulings final, 2 40 and protects the judge from reversals of erroneous
rulings if the ruling was harmless. 24 1 However, the fatal flaw with a more
detailed code and probably the reason why Professor Wigmore's code
received so little support is the fact that however hard one may try, there
is simply no way in which every possible situation which may arise at a
trial could be anticipated in advance. 2 42
B.

THE FEDERAL RULES

The Federal Rules of Evidence are our best alternative. They
represent a mixture of the three other alternatives without moving too
much in one direction. Like the French system, certain rules are
open-ended. For instance, judges have almost total discretion in the area
of expert testimony. 24 3 Then there are rules which, like the German
system, state certain broad principles but allow the trial judge discretion
in fitting the rule to particular cases. A good illustration is Rule 401,
which states the general principal that to be admitted, evidence must have
probative value. 24 4 Finally, there are those rules which, along the lines of
Professor Wigmore's proposal, leave no discretion in the hands of the
trial judge. Trial judges, for instance, must admit for impeachment
236. Benjamin Cardozo served as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court from
1932 to 1938.
237. See Nat Hentoff, The Judge With a Hole in His Soul, VILLAGE VOICE, June 28, 1994, at 19.
238. See J. WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE xiii (3d ed. 1942).
239. Id. at Rule 6, Art. 3.
240. Id. at Rule 19.
241. Id. at Rule 19, Art. 4.
242. The trial of former football star O.J. Simpson is a prime example.
243. See FED. R. Evio. 701-06; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993).
244. FED. R. EvID. 401.
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purposes those prior convictions which involve dishonesty or false
245
statements.
The strongest case, however, for the Federal Rules is the fact that
they have the public's confidence. It is widely believed, for instance,
that the truth of Professor Anita Hill's charges of sexual harassment
against then Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas could have been
ascertained had they been aired in a proceeding which employed rules
of evidence similar to the Federal Rules. 2 46 In order to test my assertion
that we should retain the Federal Rules, I decided to survey some selected
federal judges. In particular, I wanted these judges to assess the validity
of the critics' arguments against the Federal Rules. I chose to survey
those federal judges who were on the federal bench prior to the
enactment of the Federal Rules rather than the entire federal judiciary.
The survey was so limited because I believed that those judges appointed
prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules would have a unique
perspective, having judged cases under both the common law regime and
the Federal Rules. In addition, I felt that the survey would not be
accurate if the entire judiciary were included because many judges
would be favorably inclined to the Federal Rules simply because the
Federal Rules are all that they have known.
The survey, which was conducted anonymously, asked the following questions:
1) Would you prefer a) the case-by-case approach which
existed prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence or b) the
Federal Rules of Evidence?
2) Have the Federal Rules made your job harder or easier or
has there been no impact at all?
3) Have you observed any change in the quality of lawyering
as a result of the Federal Rules?
4) Have the goals of the Federal Rules (uniformity, predictability, etc.) been met?
245. See FED. R. EvID. 609.
246. See Stephen Landsman, Who Needs Evidence Rules, Anyway?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 635,
636-38 (1992) ("The seamiest proofs were constantly propounded, the most dubious opinions were
repeatedly trumpeted, and materials of the most minuscule probative value were regularly relied upon,
all in disregard of the evidentiary principles Americans have come to see as emblematic of our notions
of fair play. The rules of evidence matter if for no other reason than that they help to deter this sort of
shameful spectacle"); see also, Kim A. Taylor, Invisible Woman: Reflections on the Clarence Thomas
Confirmation Hearing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 443 (1993) ("had the Democrats imposed basic rules of
procedure, many of the ad hominem attacks against Professor Hill could have been eliminated").
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Would you like to receive the results of this survey?
Comments. 247

A total of fifty-five surveys were sent out. Forty-five responses were
received. Forty-three of the forty-five respondents preferred the Federal
Rules to the common law regime. Thirty-six responded that the Federal
Rules had made their job easier, while seven felt as though they had no
impact and two responded that the Federal Rules had made their jobs
harder. As to the quality of lawyering, twenty-five of the respondents
believed that the quality of lawyering had improved as a result of the
Federal Rules while twenty believed that it had not changed. None of the
respondents felt as though the quality of lawyering had become worse as
a result of the Federal Rules. Finally, forty-two responded that the goals
of the Federal Rules had been met while three felt as though they had
not been satisfied.
The survey demonstrates that many of the critics' complaints are
not valid. Most informative is the overwhelming belief of the judges that
the goals of the Federal Rules had been met. Thus, not only are the
Federal Rules our best alternative, but a wholesale revision of them is also
not in order.
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has demonstrated that codification of the Federal Rules
of Evidence was a good idea and that they should be retained. However,
there are steps which can be taken which would make the rules more
workable. The most important step would be the creation of a permanent standing committee on the Federal Rules.
Many of the problems associated with the Federal Rules, for
instance, the need for amendments and clarifications of ambiguities, exist
because no one has the ongoing responsibility of monitoring the Federal
247. The following comments were received:
"FRE a vast improvement."
"In my view, the Federal Rules of Evidence have been helpful."
"I would like to see the State of Virginia adopt the same rules of evidence."
"I consider the FRE a monumental step forward."
"I believe the ostensible uniformity that a codification brings is better than the
case-by-case approach pre-evidence rules. At the least, we now get a national body of
law with "workable" answers to some of the problems even though some of us may not
agree with the answers given. In this case, it is better to have a decision than to have
no decision at all."
"These rules solve quickly many questions."
"The enactment of the rules got rid of a lot of silly bickering and senseless objections."
"They have been beneficial to the trial process."
"The Federal Rules of Evidence, I believe have been most helpful."
"The Federal Rules promote uniformity and have most impact at the trial level."
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Rules. The appointment of an advisory committee on evidence rules was
a step in the right direction. However, this committee should become a
permanent standing committee.
The Judicial Conference of the United States has the authority to
create such a committee. 24 8 Furthermore, there is precedent for such a
committee; the United States Sentencing Commission serves as a permanent committee to monitor and recommend changes to the Sentencing
Guidelines 24 9 and there are standing Advisory Committees for Civil,
Criminal, Appellate, and Bankruptcy Rules to assist in monitoring the respective rules and proposing changes. A standing committee on evidence
could perform similar functions.
X.

CONCLUSION

More than twenty years after codification of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is a good time to reflect on them and to draw certain conclusions. The Federal Rules are preferable to their most viable alternatives:
the French open-ended system, the German's limited rules, and Professor Wigmore's very detailed code. Furthermore, while they are not
perfect, the federal judges have told us that the Rules have served us well.

248. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1988).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994).

